What does custody of children by an extended family member look like in Florida? A n “extended family member” may ask the court for “temporary” or “concurrent” custody of a child. Does Florida give rights to “psychological parents?”
Custody of a child is “temporary” if the award excludes the parents. It’s “concurrent” if the extended family member shares custody with the parents.
A “fictive kin” is someone “unrelated by birth, marriage, or adoption who has an emotionally significant relationship, which possesses the characteristics of a family relationship, to a child.”
How is this new? Now, someone with no relationship to the child by birth, marriage, or adoption can request temporary or concurrent custody.
Florida values permanency and stability for children. The “fictive kin” concept shows up in the dependency context. For example, Florida expanded the purposes and intent of Chapter 39 – PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO CHILDREN to include:
To ensure that, when reunification or adoption is not possible, the child will be prepared for alternative permanency goals or placements, to include, but not be limited to, long-term foster care, independent living, custody to a relative on a permanent basis with or without legal guardianship, or custody to a foster parent or legal custodian on a permanent basis with or without legal guardianship. Permanency for a child who is transitioning from foster care to independent living includes naturally occurring, lifelong, kin-like connections between the child and a supportive adult .
Section 39.001(1)(j), Florida Statutes (effective July 1, 2024). See Laws of Florida, Ch. 2024-70.
A court may order provisions the petitioner requests when it grants temporary or concurrent custody to a child’s extended family member. Such provisions must be related to the best interest of the child. They may include a reasonable transition plan for returning custody back to the child’s parent or parents.
A judge may order concurrent custody only if the parents don’t object. The judge may order temporary custody only if the parents don’t object or are unfit. Before July 1, 2020, the judge had to terminate a concurrent custody order if a parent objected to it. Further, a judge had to terminate a temporary custody order if the parent became fit.
A judge may keep a concurrent custody order in place after a parent objects. Likewise, the judge may keep a temporary custody order in place after the parents become fit. That means a court may maintain these orders beyond a parent’s objection or fitness.
What’s the rationale supporting this expanded power? The judge may allow time to ensure compliance with a transition plan or other provisions of the order “related to” the best interest of the child.
So, how might the judge do that? The judge may impose “reasonable conditions” related to the child’s best interests.
Suppose the court found a child’s parent was unfit and had ordered temporary custody with an extended family member. The court finds the time with the extended family member was “significant.”
The court may establish “reasonable conditions” in the child’s best interest for transitioning the child back to the child’s parents.
In determining such reasonable conditions, the court must consider:
Forcing a parent to allow a nonparent to see the parent’s child, following temporary or concurrent custody, “might be” unconstitutional. See analysis by the Florida Judiciary Committee Staff (December 11, 2019). Nonparents who can ask the court for temporary or concurrent child custody include “fictive kin.”
But what does “fictive kin” mean? What nonparent third parties can qualify?
The amended statute pulls in the definition of “fictive kin” from Florida’s dependency statute. For custody of children by an extended family member, “fictive kin” means a person unrelated by birth, marriage, or adoption who has an emotionally significant relationship to a child. This relationship must possess the characteristics of a family relationship. Section 39.01(2), Florida Statutes.
See also In Re: Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 345 So. 3d 729 (Fla. 2022) (adding the phrase “fictive kin or nonrelatives” throughout Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.305).
A Google Scholar search (through April 11, 2024) of “fictive kin” yields no reported contested appellate decision in Florida in which the phrase appears.
As discussed later, multiple Florida courts have rejected nonparents’ claims that their significant emotional relationships to children entitled them to rights superior to parents’ privacy right to raise their children free from interference. These cases didn’t involve temporary or concurrent custody under Chapter 751, Florida Statutes.
Parents in Florida have a fundamental constitutional right of privacy to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children without third parties interfering. Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution.
To overcome this right, there must be clear and convincing evidence the parent abandoned the child or is unfit or that placing the child with the parent will be detrimental to the child. See Malkin v. Pla, 346 So. 3d 1230 (Fa. 3d DCA 2022) (summarizing decisions).
Analyzing the amendments to Chapter 751, the Florida Judiciary Committee Staff cited Judge Logue’s summary of these parental privacy rights :
Florida’s constitutional right to privacy recognizes the zone of autonomy around a nuclear family into which a judge, legislator, or official, no matter how well intentioned, simply cannot go.
This zone protects “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 336 (Fla. 2013) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)). The only exception occurs if one of the members of the family is at risk of significant harm.
In this regard, the Florida Supreme Court has held that “[n]either the legislature nor the courts may properly intervene in parental decisionmaking absent significant harm to the child threatened by or resulting from those decisions.” Von Eiff, 720 So. 2d at 514.
Under these principles, it is violation of a parent’s right to privacy for the legislature to confer on non-parents, even biological relatives such as grandparents, the right to visit minor children against the parents’ will. See Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1277 (Fla. 1996) (holding that the State cannot impose grandparent visitation upon a minor child “without first demonstrating a harm to the child”).
Absent evidence of significant harm threatened to a child, parental privacy rights to make decisions for a child take precedence over the best interest of the child. To overcome this fundamental privacy right, the person asking to limit it must show significant harm to the child threatened by or resulting from the parent’s decisions. See generally Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So.2d 510 (Fla. 1998).
“Florida law makes no provision for visitation between unrelated parties.” L.D. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 24 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). That means, even when allowing visitation between a nonparent “psychological parent” and a child would be in the child’s best interest, courts can’t award child visitation against the will of a birth, biological, or legal parent. See De Los Milagros Castellat v. Pereira, 225 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (Logue, J., concurring). “[T]hose who claim parentage on some basis other than biology or legal status do not have the same rights, including the right to visitation, as the biological or legal parents.” Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). See also Quiceno v. Bedier, Case No. 3D23-203 (Fla. 3d DCA August 23, 2023) (discussed below).
Vivian De Los Milagros Castellat and Gisela Lissette Pereira were domestic partners who never married. They decided to have a child using assisted reproductive technology. Gisela would be the birth mother.
She gave birth to twins, born prematurely. The boy survived only two days. His sister lived, but had ongoing special needs. The women raised the child together for four years. Together they took the child to her many doctor appointments and therapy. They consulted an adoption attorney, but the domestic partner never adopted the daughter.
The birth mom’s domestic partner, Ms. De Los Milagros Castellat, had no legal basis for parental rights or visitation. Thus, even after raising the child for four years together, she couldn’t overcome Ms. Pereira’s objection and right of privacy to parent free from interference.
In Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), a former same-sex partner of a biological mother had no standing to petition for timesharing with children conceived through artificial insemination and born to the biological mother. The court interpreted the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So.3d 320 (Fla. 2013) to exclude someone not a biological or legal parent, but who has acted as a second or psychological parent, from establishing parental rights. See also Springer v. Springer, 277 So. 3d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (unenforceable coparenting agreement between a biological mom and her same-sex partner whom she never married, who had no biological connection to the child, and who never adopted the child); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th DCA1999)
A Louisiana court in Ferrand v. Ferrand, 16-7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/31/16), 221 So. 3d 909, writ denied, 16-1903 (La. 12/16/16), 211 So. 3d 1164 discussed different state law standards when a nonparent third party seeks custody or visitation over a biological or legal parent’s objection.
Cases decided after the Staff Analysis continue upholding parental privacy rights to raise children free from interference from third parties. It doesn’t matter that the third party might provide the child a better life than the parent could. See, for example, Lane-Hepburn v. Hepburn, 290 So. 3d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (reversing award of timesharing to father figure who wasn’t child’s biological or adoptive parent).
And, in Kitchen v. Cerullo, 299 So. 3d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), the court erred by granting temporary custody of child to maternal grandmother under Chapter 751, where there was insufficient evidence the dad was “unfit,” meaning clear and convincing evidence he abused, abandoned or neglected the child, as defined under the dependency statute, Chapter 39, Florida Statutes.
The Third DCA followed these principles in Malkin v. Pla, 346 So. 3d 1230 (Fa. 3d DCA 2022) The court cited lead decisions in Florida law resolving disputes between a natural parent and a third party, including a grandparent.
First, nonparents who claim parentage on some basis other than biology or legal status don’t have the same rights, including the right to visitation, as the biological or legal parents. Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); Murphy v. Markham-Crawford, 665 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Second, the “best interest of child” test under section 61.13, Florida Statutes, applies only to parents’ rights; it doesn’t extend to nonparents. Lane-Hepburn v. Hepburn, 290 So. 3d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (quoting De Los Milagros Castellat v. Pereira, 225 So. 3d 368 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (Logue, J., concurring) (“The law does not empower the courts ‘to award child visitation against the will of the birth, biological, or legal parent’ even where the courts find ‘that visitation [i]s in the best interest of the child because a non-parent qualifie[s] as a ‘psychological parent.'”)).
Third, the trial court can’t engage in a best interests of the child analysis unless there’s sufficient proof to establish the parent is unfit or there’s a substantial threat the child will face significant and demonstrable harm. LiFleur v. Webster, 138 So. 3d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).
Only “parents” have visitation rights under section 61.13, Florida Statutes. Those rights don’t extend to third parties who are not parents. The best interest of the child is insufficient to justify granting timesharing rights to any third party, even to a stepparent or to a “psychological parent.”
A man found this out the hard way in Quiceno v. Bedier, Case No. 3D23-203 (Fla. 3d DCA August 23, 2023). There, a mom challenged a final judgment of dissolution of marriage granting equal timesharing and shared parental responsibility over her son to a man. He wasn’t his biological or adoptive parent. Yet mom listed him on the child’s birth certificate as dad.
Mom later married him. During the marriage, she successfully disestablished paternity. He never sought to adopt the son or establish paternity.
Then he filed for divorce. He alleged there were three children born to the parties, including the son paternity of whom mom had disestablished. He sought equal timesharing and shared parental responsibility.
In his Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act affidavit, he swore he was the child’s father and the child had lived with him since birth, but also noted paternity had been disestablished by final judgment.
The trial judge held a hearing, then rendered the judgment ordering 50-50 timesharing and shared parental responsibility. The court cited the best interests of the child standard, found (a) paternity was disestablished, (b) the son identified the man as his dad, and (c) he financially supported the boy.
Unfortunately for the man, he had no parental rights. The boy’s attachment to him and his financial support weren’t enough to create legal parental rights over mom’s objection.
Upholding parents’ fundamental privacy right under Florida’s Constitution to parent their children, the Quiceno court cited three lead Florida Supreme Court cases:
Similarly, the First District Court of Appeals applied these principles to find a visitation agreement between a biological mom and her former same-sex partner unenforceable. See Stabler v. Spicer, Case No. 1D21-1826 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 2, 2022). Even though a mediation agreement provided for the nonparent partner to have visitation rights, the agreement was unenforceable under Florida law.
Thus, the nonparent had no legally enforceable right to have visitation with the children at issue. Instead, the court reaffirmed Article I, Section 23 of the Florida Constitution – the Privacy Clause – creates “the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into [a] person’s private life.” This privacy right extends to parents’ constitutional rights to raise their child without state interference absent the most compelling circumstances, such as child abuse.
See also Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)(“Contracts purporting to grant visitation rights to nonparents are unenforceable.”); Taylor v. Kennedy, 649 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (Florida courts don’t allow a nonparent’s claim for specific performance of a contract with a parent for visitation).
But how will this precedent affect a court’s resolving temporary or concurrent custody petitions by extended family members or fictive kin? That’s yet to be determined, but the Staff Analysis of the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee concludes:
Nonetheless, because child custody awards under ch. 751, F.S., often involve unfit parents, as well as the consent of or lack of objection to custody by a parent at the outset of the proceedings, the provisions of the bill may be distinguishable from the court opinions in which a fit parent objected to child custody at the outset of legal proceedings. Whether these differences are sufficient to survive a challenge based on the privacy rights of a fit parent is not clear.
As discussed above, amended Section 751.05(4)(a), Florida Statutes inserts an exception to a parent’s regaining physical custody of the child “at any time” after entry of a concurrent custody order.
It reads: “except that the court may approve provisions requested in the petition which are related to the best interest of the child, including a reasonable transition plan that provides for a return of custody back to the child’s parent or parents.”
Likewise, amended Section 751.05(4)(b), Florida Statutes, states a temporary custody order, “may include provisions requested in the petition “related to the best interest of the child,” including a reasonable transition plan that provides for a return of custody back to the child’s parent or parents….”
Now the court may make parents comply with provisions approved in an order granting temporary custody “related to a reasonable plan for transitioning custody before terminating the order.”
Section 751.05(6)(c) states:
If the order granting temporary custody was entered after a finding that the child’s parent or parents are unfit and the child has been in the temporary custody of an extended family member for a period of time the court determines to be significant, the court may, on its own motion, establish reasonable conditions, which are in the best interests of the child, for transitioning the child back to the custody of the child’s parent or parents.
In determining such reasonable conditions, the court must consider three things:
1. How long the child lived or resided with the extended family member.
2. The child’s developmental stage.
3. The time reasonably needed to complete the transition.
This means the court doesn’t have to terminate a concurrent custody order when either or both parents object to its continuing.
Instead, the court may make them comply, “with provisions approved in the order which are related to a reasonable plan for transitioning custody before terminating the order.”
The above provisions insert a “best interest of the child” standard. This standard would allow a judge to find it’s in the child’s best interest to restrict restored parental rights following temporary custody or concurrent custody with an extended family member. These provisions make the amended statute constitutionally vulnerable to attack.
It’s foreseeable parents who claim they’re aggrieved will challenge the constitutionality of section 751.05, Florida Statutes. They may argue a judicial order imposing “reasonable” conditions conflicts with and must yield to their constitutional right of privacy to raise their child free from third party interference.
In addition, parents may argue the statute wrongfully dilutes their constitutional privacy rights. Further, they may argue the statute circumvents and upends long-established Florida precedent striking the balance between privacy and the state’s interest in avoiding significant threatened harm to children.
For more discussion about anticipating events reasonably certain to occur , and parents’ and a court’s considering reasonable conditions pertaining to such events in parenting plans, please read here.
